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«The administration of discipline 
by the English is very rigid» 
British Military Law and the Death Penalty (1868-1918) 
Gerard Oram 1 
Les historiens ont trop longtemps considéré le droit militaire isolément, 
comme s'il s'agissait d'une entité dont l'évolution n 'avait pas de lien avec la 
société environnante. Cet article examine les similitudes dans la façon 
d'aborder les peines, entre code pénal et code militaire, en prenant pour 
point de départ la relative sévérité des peines - et en particulier de la peine 
de mort - dans l'armée britannique durant la Première Guerre mondiale. En 
dépit de plusieurs tentatives de réforme à la fin du XIXème siècle, les respons-
ables de la discipline militaire restaient attachés à des châtiments tradition-
nels. De ce point de vue, la Grande-Bretagne ressemblait davantage aux 
anciens empires russe ou autrichien qu'à la France, l'Allemagne ou les 
États-Unis. La thèse défendue par cet article est que les différentes concep-
tions de la discipline militaire étaient clairement liées au régime des peines 
dans les sociétés concernées. 
For too long, historians have regarded military law in isolation, as if it 
were an organic entity whose evolution is separate from the parent society. 
Taking as its starting point the relative severity of punishments — particularly 
the death penalty - in the British army during the First World War, this article 
analyses similarities in approaches to punishments in both the military and 
criminal codes. Despite attempts to reform the military code during the late 
nineteenth-century, those responsible for the the regulation of discipline in 
the army clung to traditional forms of punishment rather than modernising 
practises. In this respect Britain had more in common with the older empires 
of Russia and Austria than it did with those in France and Germany or with 
the United States. It is argued that the varying approaches to military disci-
pline was clearly related to practises in modes of punishment within the 
parent societies. 
In a recent study of military discipline during the First World War David Englander rightly asserted that 'British and Belgian soldiers were more at risk 
[from capital punishment] than either their French or German counterparts' 2. This 
contradicts existing ideas about both Prussian militarism and popular notions of 
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French military justice - or more accurately injustice - such as conveyed by Stanley 
Kubrick in his film Paths of Glory. A comparison of statistics for discipline in the 
British, French and German armies, the three main combatants on the Western Front 
between 1914 and 1918, supports Dr. Englander: the British condemned more than 
3000 men compared with 2000 in the French army and only 150 in the German 
army 3. Indeed, the comparative harshness of the British was especially marked in 
the case of deserters on the Western Front 4. Whilst it should be noted that the number 
of French soldiers executed (perhaps as many as 700) exceeded that of the British 
army (officially 346, but probably many more 5 ) the two remain comparable given 
the relative size of the armies. Only 48 of the 150 German soldiers condemned by 
military courts were shot. On the face of it the British army was not beset by disci-
plinary problems any more than were the other major armies, yet no historian has 
adequately explained this striking differential. This is even more surprising given 
pervasive British attitudes of the time: Germany was castigated as authoritarian and 
militaristic and France was viewed from across the Channel as decadent. The French 
army, so it appeared, was not immune from this and its collapse at Sedan was 
regarded by many in Britain as evidence of the moral degeneration of the French, a 
view seemingly confirmed by the chaos of the Commune. Accordingly, when disci-
pline in the French army collapsed in 1917, the British commander, Field Marshal 
Sir Douglas Haig, emphasised what he considered the lack of 'moral qualities' in the 
French army as its major cause 6. Paradoxically, German authoritarianism and mili-
tarism had, according to some, been a major factor in securing the Prussian victory 
in 1871 : British generals had a high regard for the discipline of the Prussian army if 
not their tactics7. Yet these continental armies exhibited more tolerance of their sol-
diers than the supposedly more progressive British. Paradoxically, therefore, it was 
in the country that believed it most espoused liberal values that military discipline 
appears to have taken on its harshest form. 
None of this was lost on contemporary observers. In his diary Prince Rupprecht 
of Bavaria commented that : 
The administration of discipline by the English is very rigid. Whilst on our side 
there is known to me only a single case in which a soldier on account of aggravated 
refusal of duty in the face of the enemy was shot, I gather from a compilation of the 
British orders which have been found, that at least 67 English soldiers have been 
shot under martial law in the period between 27 October 1916 and 30 August 19178. 
3
 Moore (1974), Putkowski, Sykes (1992), Babington (1993). 
4
 Oram (1998a, pp. 51-56). In theatres far from home the British could afford to be less severe with 
deserters who in reality had nowhere to flee to and would inevitably return to their units after a short 
period of time. Disciplinary concerns in these far off places tended to focus on other matters such as 
men sleeping at their posts - an offence for which capital punishment was rarely carried out. 
5
 British figures are based on the War Office publication Statistics of the Military Effort of the British 
Empire in the Great War 1914-1920 (HMSO, London, 1922), p. 648. However, this figure does not 
include native labourers, nor does it include Indian troops for whom no official records survive. A 
recent survey of the registers of courts-martial kept by the army has cast doubt on the accuracy of the 
official number of condemnations which, it appears, have been slightly under-estimated. See Oram 
(1998b). The number of executions in the British army, including Indian troops, certainly exceeded 
400 although by how many it is difficult to say. 
6
 Blake (1952, p. 234). 
7
 Spiers (1992, p. 246). 
8
 Quoted in Babington (1993, p. 191). 
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This was an underestimate of British executions during that period, which actu-
ally numbered eighty-one. Ludendorff famously recorded his envy of Douglas 
Haig's power over matters of discipline and punishment estimating that the real loss 
to his army in terms of manpower ran to tens of thousands 9. Indeed, that entry in his 
memoirs, published in 1929, doubtless reflected a variation in the stab in the back 
legend, widely held by former military commanders, that Germany's comparative 
leniency had cost her victory 1 0. 
However, the old-fashioned view that British disciplinary harshness was attrib-
utable to an oppressive and ultimately incompetent High Command will no longer 
do. British commanders, like their German and French equivalents, worked within a 
disciplinary and judicial framework inherited from the nineteenth-century 1 1. For too 
long, historians have ignored this inheritance, most especially the influence of the 
parent societies of armies: military discipline, law and organisation should be 
related to the parent societies. It is no longer sufficient to separate military law from 
the criminal code as if it had developed organically, isolated from contemporary 
views on criminal behaviour, punishments and penal policy. It is the development of 
the respective military codes, the context for military discipline and punishments 
during the First World War, which must now be analysed. 
In this article I will discuss the evolution of British military law from the mid-
nineteenth century to the outbreak of war in 1914, within the wider context of mili-
tary law in other European countries, in particular that of the French and German 
armies, and America. I will show how the variations in numbers of capital punish-
ments inflicted by each army between 1914 and 1918 reflected military traditions 
and pre-existing social structures as well as more general concerns about crime, 
punishment and control of the army. It will be shown that in terms of its military 
code, far from being progressive, Britain lagged behind its continental equivalents 
in key areas. The process by which men were selected for execution, being beyond 
the scope of this study, is the subject of a forthcoming article. Instead this article 
focuses on the role played by the lawmakers in the history of British military execu-
tions. 
The judiciousness of the respective military codes often reflected the status 
ascribed by societies to both the army and to soldiering as a profession. This in turn 
was greatly influenced by the traditional method of recruitment. In Britain in partic-
ular obedience was often deemed to be attainable only through traditional concepts 
of punishment based on fear and deterrence. Indeed, an over-reliance on this type of 
control meant that, come the Great War - by which time corporal punishment had 
been abolished - senior commanders all too readily fell back on capital punishment 
as the sole means of maintaining discipline rather than exploring alternatives. 
9
 Moore (1974, p. 167). 
1 0
 See Jahr (1998). 
1 1
 Christoph Jahr excepted, even in recent studies historians have concerned themselves with the con-
sequences of the executions rather than the underlying causes. Sheffield (1994), analyses many of 
the army's traditions, but has largely avoided military law. The most recent publication on the subject 
of executions, Offenstadt (1999), as the title suggests, is concerned with processes that occurred after 
the executions rather than before them. 
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BACKGROUND 
The harsh nature of military discipline in Britain owed much to tradition. The 
earliest armies were regulated by Articles of War issued on the prerogative of the 
Crown and valid only during the duration of any given conflict. This power, intro-
duced by William I, was not superseded until the nineteenth-century. But if military 
law seemingly became more the concern of parliament than of the Sovereign, the 
Crown was still able to exert considerable influence in this area, playing the 'apolit-
ical' card to great effect - the army shared with the Crown a (mythical) status that 
supposedly transcended politics. The nature of these earlier Articles was pejora-
tively described in a military manual of 1914 as being 'of excessive severity, inflict-
ing death or loss of limb for almost every crime' 1 2 . Ironically, a certain amount of 
this severity was to return in the years that followed. 
The peacetime army, thanks to the British aversion to a standing army, did not 
exist in a modern sense and no regulations were thought necessary beyond what was 
covered by criminal and civil law. This changed, however, after the so-called 
Glorious Revolution whereupon the Mutiny Act was passed in 1689. The object of 
this annually renewable act, which made mutiny and desertion a capital offence, 
remained largely unchanged until 1878. It did, however, undergo a series of refine-
ments each reflecting the circumstances of the time. The Act, often allowed to lapse 
during times of peace, was frequently re-introduced, usually with an extension of its 
jurisdiction to include overseas territories as the army's garrison duties expanded 
around the globe. The Mutiny Act finally superseded the prerogative power to make 
Articles of War towards the end of the Peninsular War in 1813 and remained in 
force, largely unaltered until our period. 
INQUIRY: 1868-1879 
Increasingly concerned by what it perceived as a drunkenness problem in the 
army, the British government ordered an inquiry into military discipline in March 
1868 under the tutelage of the Right Honourable John Wilson Patten MP, a colonel 
in the Royal Lancashire Militia. It is clear from the evidence, however, that the 
Committee was uncertain about how to maintain discipline and control of the army 
in the event of the abolition of corporal punishment. Flogging (the usual nomencla-
ture) had been partially abolished in 1867 following the death of Private Robert Slim 
from such punishment 1 3 , but it remained available as a punishment during peace-
time for crimes of mutiny or insubordination involving violence and during wartime 
it was extended to cover desertion and even drunkenness. For a decade the army 
used flogging sparingly, but its re-emergence as a common punishment in Zululand 
in 1879 attracted the attention of Liberal politicians, including Gladstone, who 
rejected the 'necessary deterrent' argument and denounced the practice as anachro-
nistic. The number of lashes was initially reduced by Parliament before its final abo-
lition in 1881 1 4 . 
12
 Manual of Military Law, 1914 edition (HMSO, 1914, p. 7). 
1 3
 Spiers (1992, p. 73). 
1 4
 Spiers (1992, p. 74). 
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The shift away from traditional style punishments such as flogging during the 
late 1860s reflected a similar trend favouring a more progressive penal policy, 
which, aided by a statistical reduction in the crime rate, can also be detected in the 
criminal code . Public whippings for criminal offences had been abolished in 1862 
and the last public execution was carried out in 1868, largely thanks to growing 
public disquiet at the effects on society of such punishments 1 6. The effects on 
offenders were, however, of less concern and in the 1860s penal policy did assume 
a harsher character once again, especially with the introduction of the draconian 
'Garotters' Act 1862, which allowed for the administration of up to fifty lashes on 
prisoners convicted of violent offences. This was partly a response to the virtual end 
of transportation in the 1850s and a corresponding perceived rise in violent crime 1 7 . 
Britain was the last Western European country to cling to whipping as a punishment 
and in both the criminal and military codes we must look to Eastern Europe to find 
parallels. The number of floggings in English local prisons remained fairly constant 
(approximately 155 per annum) until a significant reduction was noted in 1894 1 8. 
This was partly as a result of concerns about the number of corporal punishments 
and it was becoming increasingly clear to British military observers that the days of 
flogging in the army were also numbered. But concerns about how to control unruly 
soldiers closely mirrored the fears aroused by the end of transportation - pundits 
believed, after all, that most troops were drawn from that same criminal class. The 
need to find a suitable alternative became the focus of the subsequent report. 
The report, published in two parts duringl869 1 9 , set in motion a process of yet 
further inquiry and eventually reform, culminating in the annually renewable Army 
Act of 1881 - the basis for the regulation of the British, Dominion and Empire 
armies during the Great War. This process coincided not only with the changing atti-
tude towards crime and punishment, but also with a growing realisation amongst 
military pundits that the changing nature of warfare would necessitate an enlarge-
ment of the army, control of which became a real concern. Although the report pro-
vides a unique insight into perceptions about army recruits, discipline and 
punishment in Victorian Britain it has received little attention from historians. 
Before arriving at its conclusions the Committee examined military law in other 
countries, including France and Prussia, and whilst this evidence tells us more about 
how the British army viewed its continental neighbours, it remains a useful starting 
point for a comparison of military codes across Europe. 
The various European military codes had much in common. Nowhere was the 
final arbiter of military justice a judicial or legal appointee. In some countries 
(Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy) the Commander-in-Chief of the army performed 
this function during wartime. In others, France for example, the head of state theo-
retically held this position. Of course in some cases (Russia, Prussia) the head of 
state was also the Commander-in-Chief of the army making such distinctions super-
fluous. This had important implications in Britain where the role of the Judge 
1 5
 Taylor (1998). 
1 6
 Wiener (1990, pp. 92-101). 
1 7
 Emsley (1996, pp. 276-277). 
1 8
 McConville (1995, p. 246). 
19
 The Report of the Courts-Martial Commission 1869 - hereafter referred to as either The First Report 
or The Second Report. 
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Advocate General (JAG), who oversaw the process of military justice, had come 
under considerable scrutiny in the mid-nineteenth-century. Army commanders had 
become increasingly concerned at the growing influence of the JAG and saw a threat 
to their authority if judicial considerations were given priority over disciplinary 
ones 2 0 . This too was common in other European armies. In Russia, for example, a 
Judge Advocate (procureur militaire) attended courts-martial to prosecute only and 
did not act in a judicial capacity 2 1. Typically, in the late nineteenth-century Habsburg 
army, where courts were composed of representatives of all ranks - an exceptional 
practice not continued after the turn of the century - a Militädrauditor, who was a 
qualified lawyer, performed a range of legal tasks, but could only make recommen-
dations to the military judges. In common with other European countries 'the 
[Habsburg] army managed to prevent any serious tampering with its [judicial] priv-
ileges' 2 2 . The role of non-military persons or departments was invariably restricted 
to purely administrative duties. Nowhere did these civil servants wrest a modicum 
of judicial authority from the military no matter how well qualified they were 2 3 . 
Other similarities included a hierarchical system of courts-martial with varying 
jurisdiction. Officers were normally only tried by the highest form of military court. 
However, in Italy there was no permanent court with jurisdiction to try officers, 
reflecting the rarity of such trials. It was also universally accepted that judicial pro-
cedure gave way to military expediency during wartime when it was usual for 
courts, often known as drum-head courts, to be convened in the field 2 4. 
Despite the common heritage of much European law - not to mention military 
tradition - differences did exist and these often reflected the parent society. British 
observers reported, with apparent envy, on the French system which allowed for the 
removal of the persistent offender into a compagnie de discipline and the reputed 
bad character into light infantry units in Algeria 'so that he may not taint his old 
comrades by going back into their ranks' 2 5 . This aspect of French military justice, 
enshrined in the 1857 code, reflected the concept of the 'dangerous classes' familiar 
to those concerned with national security in France since 1840. This is now most 
usually associated with the period of the Paris Commune when police and army 
alike were fearful of 'an uncontrollable and destructive rising of the 'lower 
depths" 2 6 . Control of the army in such circumstances was understandably consid-
ered crucial, and the military code allowed for the swift removal of soldiers who fell 
into this category. Extensive use was made of this provision and executions were 
certainly not unheard of during the revolutionary decades in the middle of the nine-
teenth-century: eighty-four men were executed between 1833 and 1851. 
Significantly, most of these occurred in units in North Africa. On the other hand 
about a third of French courts-martial resulted in acquittals - a rare finding in the 
British army 2 7 . 
2 0
 Rubin (1997, pp. 45-84). 
2 1
 The Second Report, p. 216. 
2 2
 Deák(1992,p. 146). 
2 3
 The Second Report, pp. 211 -223. 
2 4
 The Second Report, pp. 211 -223. 
2 5
 The Second Report, p. 223. 
2 6
 Tombs (1980, p. 234). 
2 7
 Griffith (1989, p. 172). 
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The severity of the Prussian code was also viewed with some envy from London. 
Undoubtedly there was a genuine regard for Prussian-style discipline, but it is also 
likely that Prussian military prowess during the 1860s had boosted the army's repu-
tation. This admiration increased after the Franco-Prussian War when the draconian 
Prussian code was contrasted with the lenient French code seemingly confirming the 
view that linked military efficiency to strict discipline. The British military attache 
responsible for the compilation of the report on the Prussian code was impressed by 
the sentence of 'loss of nobility' and all that it implied. He was equally impressed 
with the power granted to commanders summarily to inflict corporal punishments 
and the life-long disgrace that went with dismissal from the army 2 8 . Indeed, notions 
of honour pervaded the Prussian code and only executions for military offences 
were performed by the honourable method of a firing squad. Otherwise, death was 
inflicted by beheading. 
Such comparisons and the envy they provoked from British military observers 
took no account of the differences in attitudes towards the army in each society. In 
Prussia, soldiering was considered a noble and worthy profession - hence the dis-
grace resulting from dismissal from the army. The French army inherited much of its 
identity from its revolutionary and Napoleonic predecessors: the poilu was ideally 
an 'Intelligent Bayonet' - a concept partly formed from a reaction against so-called 
Prussian automata - and the State assumed a paternal responsibility towards those it 
compelled to serve in the ranks 2 9 . In Britain the difference could not be more 
marked. Far from being an honourable profession soldiering was considered worth-
less by most classes, but most especially among the working class who regarded the 
army as a refuge for drunkards and criminals rather than a respectable trade. Hunger 
was the most effective of recruiting sergeants and it was no coincidence that the Irish 
disproportionately filled the ranks even of nominally English regiments 3 0. 
It was in this context that British army discipline had evolved. The result was a 
form of discipline that was particularly harsh as this was believed to be the only 
effective means of ordering men drawn from the very bottom strata of society. 
However, the challenge to traditional ideas on punishments such as flogging was 
forcing the army to explore alternatives. There were three forms of serious punish-
ment available to courts-martial: imprisonment, flogging and marking (known as 
branding, this was itself abolished in 1871) - whereby the prisoner was 'marked' 
with a letter 'D ' for deserter or ' B C ' for bad character. Analysis of punishments 
handed out by British courts-martial during the three years prior to the abolition of 
flogging for most military offences in 1867 shows a shifting of emphasis towards 
imprisonment at the expense of flogging (see figure l ) 3 1 . However, it is apparent that 
the army was still making wide use of flogging despite its imminent abolition. 
The Second Report, pp. 219-220. 
Griffith (1989, pp. 86-87). 
In 1830 it was estimated that the Irish made up approximately 42 per cent of the British army. This 
proportion steadily decreased up to 1914, but the number of Irishmen serving in the pre-Great War 
British army remained disproportionately high. See Denman (1991, pp. 352-365). 
Soldiers could be sentenced to imprisonment with or without hard labour. The court could also sen-
tence them to solitary confinement, again with or without hard labour. The figures presented here are 
an aggregate of all these categories. Only a minority (just over 600 in each year) underwent solitary 
confinement. 
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Interestingly, the practice of marking had increased. Possibly some men who 
would otherwise have been flogged found themselves marked instead, but the most 
likely explanation of the dramatic rise in marking soldiers is that this represented an 
attempt by the army to ensure that unwanted recruits did not re-enlist after 
flogging had been partially abolished in 1867. The commissioners unwittingly 
alluded to this when they attempted to justify the unpopular practice, stating 'the 
real object of marking is not the punishment of the offender but the protection of the 
public ' 3 3 . More striking, though, is the comparatively little use made of the power to 
discharge offenders: only 106, 122 and 184 discharges in each respective 
year 3 4 , reflecting ongoing concerns about poor manpower levels 3 5. The British 
army's reluctance to give up corporal punishments contrasts with the French 
army where corporal punishment had long been interdicted, and the Austro-
Hungarian army where the flogging of recruits was abolished in 1868 3 6. István Deák 
has shown that a high proportion of courts-martial in the Habsburg army con-
cerned cases of brutality against subordinates 3 7. This might suggest a general move 
away from violent disciplinary punishment during this liberal era in the Dual-
Monarchy. 
This clinging to flogging and the branding of offenders was not exclusive to the 
British. Russian courts-martial could order corporal punishments to be administered 
summarily in the presence of a soldier's company or battalion 3 8. Elsewhere corporal 
punishments were less apparent: most armies only allowed for some form of 
restraint rather than flogging. The procedure adopted in the Dual Monarchy after 
1868 was to fix prisoners to an object such as a post or a tree by way of rings 
attached to the ankles and wrists 3 9. 
The Commissioners concluded that existing punishments needed to be strength-
ened with more use being made of military prisons. Imprisonment, they suggested, 
'should be made as severe and deterrent as a due regard for the health of the prisoner 
and the laws of humanity will permit' 4 0 . Otherwise fines, which could be used to 
3 2
 Compiled from statistics contained in the appendix to The Second Report, pp. 255-278. 
3 3
 The Second Report, p. x. 
3 4
 Appendix to The Second Report, pp. 255-278. 
3 5
 Spiers (1980, p. 37). 
3 6
 The Second Report, p. 212. 
3 7
 Deák (1992, p. 147). 
3 8
 Report on the Various Methods of Punishment adopted by Foreign Armies in the Field (1879), PRO 
WO32/6045, pp. 2-3. Hereafter referred to as The Ellice Report. 
3 9
 The Ellice Report, p. 5. 
4 0
 The First Report, p. viii. 
Figure 1: Punishments inflicted by British courts-martial 1865-186732 
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fund 'rewards to well conducted men' and greater use of the power to discharge men 
who were 'beyond the power of reformation' were proposed 4 1. 
However, no immediate alterations were made to the manner in which the army 
was regulated and the Mutiny Act remained the key statute, continuing to reflect tra-
ditional ideas about discipline. For example, the 1876 version outlined a number of 
military offences for which the death penalty could be applied. These included 
mutiny, sedition, desertion, cowardice, sleeping at or leaving a post, striking or 
using violence towards a superior officer and disobedience 4 2. It also established 
rules for the constitution of courts-martial and laid down procedures for the execu-
tion of sentences. The power of any court-martial to inflict corporal punishments 
was retained 4 3, but only during times of war and with an upper limit of fifty lashes 4 4. 
Such a sentence could be commuted to not more than forty-two days imprisonment 
or twenty days and twenty-five lashes 4 5. Clearly corporal punishment continued to 
be considered an essential element in the maintenance of military discipline. 
The legislators had recognised that special powers were required in times of war 
and special provision was also included with regard to the death penalty. Only the 
highest form of court - the General Court-Martial - was granted the power to 
impose a sentence of death. This type of court was constituted of no fewer than nine 
commissioned officers (no upper limit), at least two-thirds of whom had to concur 
for a sentence of death to be lawful 4 6. Provision was made for these powers to be 
transferred to a Detachment General Court-Martial during wartime with a reduced 
constitution of at least three commissioned officers. To avoid any political involve-
ment sentences had to be confirmed by the Monarch or, during active service, the 
Commander-in-Chief. There remained no right of appeal and, therefore, no appeal 
court. 
REFORM: 1879-1881 
The Army Council re-considered military discipline in 1879, ordering another 
report on punishments in other armies. Little had altered in the decade separating the 
two reports, but one significant change had occurred in Germany. The Prussian 
code, so admired by British generals, had been replaced with an altogether more 
progressive German one in 1872. The death penalty was retained, but soldiers 
received greater protection from the new code. The administration of law was the 
responsibility of the Kriegsgerichtsrat (Judge-Advocate), under the jurisdiction of 
the Oberquartiermeister (Administrative Staff), attached to the General Staff47. 
Furthermore, German soldiers were granted legal rights, Rechsstaatlichkeit, as pro-
tection from abuses of authority. However, for some reason this information was not 
considered worthy of inclusion in the report. 
4 1
 The First Report, pp. ix-x. 
4 2
 Mutiny Act, Section 15. 
4 3
 Mutiny Act, Section 23. 
4 4
 Mutiny Act, Section 22. 
4 5
 Mutiny Act, Section 24. 
4 6
 Mutiny Act, Section 8. 
47
 The Handbook of the German Army in War, January 1917 (EP Publishing, Wakefield, 1973, pp. 30-
37). Also, Militärstrafgesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich vom 20. Juni 1872 (Berlin, 1912). 
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The report, compiled by General Sir Charles Ellice, largely confirmed the find-
ings of the 1869 Inquiry, but had to take account of the new German code and the 
American one. Ellice identified twelve capital crimes in the German code including 
repeated desertion. A sole act of desertion, however, even if committed in the field, 
was punishable by a maximum of ten years imprisonment 4 8. Curiously, he omitted 
the offence of leaving a watch, contained in the German code (a similar offence, 
abandoning a post was a capital crime in the French army only if it was committed 
in the presence of the enemy). Like its French equivalent the German code allowed 
for the removal of individual offenders to penal battalions, but unlike the British in 
neither the French or the German armies was the offence of sleeping on post con-
sidered sufficiently serious to merit the death penalty. 
Ellice drew attention to Article 54 of the 1874 American Articles of War, which 
prohibited both flogging and branding, but also pointed out that previously the 
United States had been forced to re-introduce flogging for deserters. Although cor-
poral punishment was finally abolished in the American army in 1861, Ellice drew 
attention to the Judge-Advocate-General's remarks which allowed for other physi-
cal punishments: 
courts-martial must needs often draw upon the customs of the service for a 
penalty which shall insure the description of a corporal punishment. Thus, the 
accused may be adjudged to carry a loaded knapsack for a certain time, stand on 
a barrel, or suffer any other ignominy which would naturally result in a degree of 
bodily pain or fatigue, provided the same were not excessive and physically inju-
rious49 . 
American military law at this time can still be regarded as a direct descendant of 
the British code. As such it was not as tightly constructed as the German code. Wide-
ranging powers were bestowed on the Commander-in-Chief in times of war. For 
example, capital punishment was permissible, but the restrictions imposed by 
Article 47 could easily be bypassed: 
No sentence of a Court-Martial or Military Commission, inflicting the punish-
ment of death, shall be carried into execution until it shall have been corurrmed 
by the President; except in the cases of persons convicted, in time of war, as spies, 
mutineers, deserters, or murderers, and in the cases of guerrilla marauders con-
victed in time of war; of robbery, burglary, arson, rape, assault with intent to 
commit rape, or of violation of the laws and customs of war; and in such excepted 
cases the sentence of death may be carried into execution upon confirmation of 
the Commanding General in the field, or the Commander of the geographical 
division or department, as the case may be 5 0. 
However, there were signs that the American code was detaching itself from its 
heredity. Unlike the British code, the American Articles did at least envisage a role 
for a political person such as the President. This represented the start of a movement 
The Ellice Report, p. 5. The twelve capital offences listed by Ellice are: treason, unjustifiable sur-
render, repeated desertion, instigating a conspiracy to desert, deserting a post in the presence of the 
enemy, cowardice, disobedience, assaulting a superior, instigating a mutiny, participating in a 
mutiny, plundering (only if accompanied by killing) and breach of parole by POWs. 
Ellice Report, p. 2. 
Ellice Report, p. 2. 
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away from British influence and towards a military code with a distinctly American 
identity — a process not completed until 1916 when a new military code was 
approved in time for America's entry into the First World War. Perhaps Ellice was 
unaware of this development or had attached no importance to it, but other 'mod-
ernising' provisions were present in the 1874 Articles. As well as an allowance for 
adjournments there was an increased role for the Judge-Advocate-General who 
could be appointed to any court-martial. This direct role for a judicial rather than a 
military figure was a sure sign that the emphasis was beginning to shift from the dis-
ciplinary function of the court-martial to one of a dispenser of justice. David 
Schleuter has remarked that these provisions 'marked to some extent an increased 
realization [sic] by Congress that due process considerations should apply' 5 1 . The 
exigencies of the war did force the British army to belatedly introduce similar pro-
visions, but even then it was not by Act of Parliament. However, the creation of 
thirty-four Court-Martial-Officers5 2 (CMO) - legally trained personnel who could 
attend trials to ensure their legality - in 1916 had little impact: condemnations con-
tinued apace during 1916 and 1917 5 3. Nor did the creation of the post appease critics 
in the Labour Party - arguably its true purpose. 
Developments across the Atlantic passed-by the British legislators, who clung 
firmly to tradition. The Army Discipline and Regulation (Annual) Act of 1879, 
which parliament had to approve annually, rationalised the disparate military law 
under one statute, but it was not until the 1881 version that flogging was finally abol-
ished (Section 6). Other punishments - bearing an uncanny resemblance to those of 
the Austrian army - were introduced instead (Section 4), revealing the influence of 
other European models 5 4 . These entailed handcuffing offenders to a cart or wagon or 
requiring them to carry extra weights known as 'burdens' 5 5 . However, here the army 
was clearly out of step with the criminal code where the use of irons or other 
mechanical restraints as punishments had been forbidden by the Prison Act, 1865, 
except in exceptional circumstances - themselves the subject of further restrictions 
in 1893 5 6 . 
The Army Act, also 1881 and renewable annually, was the culmination of the 
process of inquiry and was intended to reform and modernise British military law. 
Yet it bore a closer relationship to earlier British models and to those of the old 
empires in Eastern Europe than it did to the more progressive ones in Western 
Europe. The Act outlined a total of twenty-seven capital offences - twelve were 
punishable by death at any time and fifteen were so punishable on active service 
only. These are summarised in figures 2 and 3 : 
5 1
 Schleuter (1980, p. 154). 
5 2
 Hurst (1919, p. 323). 
5 3
 There were 895 condemnations in the British army during 1916 and a further 904 in 1917 - equiva-
lent to a monthly average of 75. 
5 4
 Army Discipline and Regulation (Annual) Act 1881. 
5 5
 Draft Rules as to Summary Punishments Proposed to be made by the Secretary of State under 
Section 4 of the Army Discipline and Regulation (Annual) Bill 1881-1882. 
5 6
 McConville (1995, p. 148). 
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Figure 3: Offences only punishable by death if committed on active service 
Clearly capital punishment was available for a wide range of offences, both mili-
tary and criminal. Of particular interest here is the inclusion of certain criminal 
offences such as housebreaking, which had ceased to be a capital crime in the criminal 
code some decades earlier. This is an unambiguous indication of the status ascribed to 
British troops and the nature of the concerns about their anticipated behaviour. Indeed, 
during the First World War there were a number of death sentences passed on British 
soldiers for housebreaking, robbery and even four (unlawfully) for being drunk 5 7. The 
5 7
 Oram (1998b, p. 15). 
Figure 2: Offences punishable by death 
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Army Act also created a greater number of capital offences than existed in the 
French or German armies illustrating what is perhaps the most important difference 
between European military codes : the fundamental question of offences and pun-
ishments. These varied more widely than is often thought by historians. Therefore, 
simple comparisons of death sentence statistics without some analysis of the respec-
tive codes are wholly unsatisfactory. What was a capital offence in one army was not 
necessarily punishable by death in another: sleeping on post, abandoning a post or 
single acts of desertion most notably. 
Furthermore, capital offences were variously constructed and defined in differ-
ent armies. Take, for instance, the crime of desertion, which according to a British 
pamphlet of 1916, was 'at any time a serious one, but more especially so when the 
deserter's regiment is on active service' 5 8. In fact desertion accounted for approxi-
mately seventy-five per cent of the executions in the British army between 1914 and 
1920. A British soldier was guilty of desertion if he: 
a) Deserts [that is intends to avoid a particular duty] or attempts to desert Her [or 
His] Majesty's service; or 
b) Persuades, endeavours to persuade, procures or attempts to procure, any 
person subject to military law to desert Her Majesty's service. 
And: 
if he committed such offence when on active service or under orders for active 
service, [he shall] be liable to suffer death, or such less punishment as is in this 
Act mentioned59. 
The French code was not so straightforward and broke the offence into two types : 
désertion à l'ennemi and désertion à l'intérieur. Only the former was punishable by 
death with the lesser offence of désertion à l'intérieur attracting a maximum penalty 
of five years penal servitude even in time of war. The German code of 1872, as 
opposed to the Prussian code, also regarded desertion as a more complex affair than 
the British : in the German army offenders could only be sentenced to death in the 
case of recidivists who had previously been convicted of the offence6 0. 
Paradoxically, therefore, Britain had adopted a harsher military code than the 
mass armies of its European neighbours with Germany and France legislating for a 
greater degree of tolerance, particularly in the case of desertion. The reasons for this 
are not so elusive as might appear. Britain had retained the voluntary principle as the 
basis for recruitment and with it came a crucial difference in attitudes towards 
absenteeism. In France and Germany a certain degree of desertion was tolerated, 
expected even, amongst soldiers who had been compelled to serve. This was 
reflected in the separation of the different types of desertion identified by the French 
code and the corresponding leniency of sentence in the case of men convicted of 
désertion à l'intérieur and in the German principle of Rechtsstaatlichkeit. For the 
British, however, no such tolerance was considered necessary for men who had 
enlisted of their own volition. 
Grierson (1916, p. 52). 
Army Act 1881, Section 12.1 as published in The Public General Acts passed in the forty-fourth and 
forty-fifth years of the reign of Her Majesty Queen Victoria (Eyre and Spottiswood, London, 1881, 
p. 209). 
Militärstrafgesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich vom 20. Juni 1872 (Berlin, 1912). 
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Other traditions were at play as well. In its criminal code Britain was consis-
tently more reliant on capital punishment than most other European countries. 
During the period 1900-1914 there were on average twenty-seven death sentences 
passed annually by criminal courts in England and Wales, with an average of fifteen 
executions carried out. By contrast, in France, where juries could accept mitigating 
circumstances in order to avoid the death penalty, the figures were twenty-three and 
five respectively. Capital punishment was not practised in nineteenth-century 
Prussia and in other German territories executions were rare although it was rein-
troduced by Bismarck in 1878. Despite the change during the Wilhelmine era, when 
clemency was generally refused as a matter of state policy 6 1, Britain remained 
exceptional in its reliance on the death penalty. Even in Tsarist Russia the death 
penalty was rarely used in criminal cases - although continued use of the knout 
resulted in many deaths and little restraint was shown in the army. Nineteenth-
century abolitionists castigated Britain as 'the most merciless of Christian countries' 
with a 'backward and unsatisfactory' criminal law 6 2 . In America too, many states 
had abolished the death penalty 6 3. Britain, though, clung on to capital punishment -
a practice reflected in its military code. 
The concentration of power in the office of the Commander-in-Chief, although 
common in most European armies, was effectively unfettered in the British army. 
There is a parallel here with the role performed by the Home Office in the nineteenth-
century, which acted to mitigate capital convictions especially where insanity was 
suspected. The process of assessing a condemned prisoner's sanity to prevent injus-
tices and avoid adverse publicity, in spite of the assumption of adult responsibility 
established by Common Law 6 4 , anticipated the role the Commander-in-Chief later 
performed in relation to soldiers suspected to be suffering from the condition known 
as shell-shock. What singled out military law, however, was the absence of any appel-
late system: other officers and indeed the JAG made recommendations, but the 
Commander-in-Chief was the only authority who could set aside the sentence of the 
court. In the German army soldiers were protected to a certain extent by statutory 
rights and French soldiers had the theoretical protection of the President of the 
Republic 6 5. Even Russian and Austrian soldiers were not theoretically denied a right 
of appeal to a higher court 6 6. But British soldiers had to place their faith entirely in the 
hands of a Commander-in-Chief who was required to put discipline above justice. 
The Manual of Military Law was explicit that 'The object of military law is to main-
tain discipline among the troops and other persons forming part of or following an 
army' 6 7 . The role of the Commander-in-Chief has to be understood in this context. 
6 1
 Figures based on comparative tables in Evans (1996, pp. 914-935). See also Radzinowicz and Hood 
(1986, pp. 671-677). 
6 2
 Cited in Radzinowicz & Hood (1986, p. 672). 
6 3
 Galliher, Ray & Cook (1992, pp. 538-578). 
6 4
 Roger Chadwick (1992, pp. 231-285). 
6 5
 During the First World War the President was slow to exercise this power and the army commanders 
were unrestrained for the first year or so. However, the existence of this safeguard was an important 
feature of French military law. The same type of power was conferred on the President of the USA, 
who exercised it from the outset in the American army. 
6 6
 It should be noted that appeals remained problematic in both the Russian and Austrian armies, but 
were certainly not unprecedented. 
67
 Manual of Military Law, p. 6. 
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By 1881 all the countries that would be at war in 1914 had formulated the rules 
that were to regulate their armies Tradition had been a major factor. So too had 
varying attitudes towards crime and punishment. For these reasons the British army 
adopted a code more closely resembling those of the old authoritarian empires of 
Eastern Europe than those of Germany or France. 
CONCLUSION 
Unwittingly, the legislators had laid down the very conditions which ensured 
that, in terms of capital punishment, the British soldier was more vulnerable than his 
French or German counterparts. In one respect this is surprising: this does not 
appear to have been the intentions of the legislators who, by removing the old prac-
tices of flogging and branding, were attempting to ring the changes to what had 
become the unacceptable face of military discipline. However, the new code 
reflected much of the criminal law, which itself placed enormous emphasis in the 
death penalty as a means of deterring crime. During the First World War military 
commanders adopted just such an approach and the law encouraged them to do so. 
Why was military law so framed? For the answer we must again look to the 
criminal code. The parallels are not so elusive and tradition remained an important 
influence. Military law, as represented by the Army Act 1881, simply followed 
earlier British models and reflected traditional fears about control of the army and 
the quality of recruits. In fact it was highly unlikely that the British could have envis-
aged a military code such as existed across the Channel or the Atlantic. The result 
was a code that placed additional responsibility on the Commander-in-Chief during 
wartime. His function as the final arbiter in legal matters bore a marked similarity to 
the role of the Home Office: both were expected to mitigate condemnations from 
the courts to an acceptable level. One had to balance public opinion against public 
order, the other troop morale and discipline. Yet in practice this judicial role was not 
compatible with the Commander-in-Chief's overriding responsibility for army dis-
cipline. Unlike the French or American armies, which placed ultimate judicial 
responsibility on their respective Presidents, British tradition dictated that politi-
cians were not be to be trusted with a modicum of control over the military. In peace-
time the Crown fulfilled the role which was delegated to the Commander-in-Chief 
during wartime. No doubt his role was delegated further, but the important feature of 
the system was that British soldiers had to rely on the benevolence of senior officers 
who were virtually unaccountable, at least for the duration of the war. 
It seems likely that the army got what it wanted from the legislators: a code that 
reflected army traditions. Like the Crown, the army was not as apolitical as it was 
usually painted. Despite the reforms the army retained its traditional approach to 
discipline in a code that remained immune from interference from civil servants 
such as the JAG or from politicians. The army's reputation as a non-political organ-
isation is indeed mythical. As Hew Strachan has shown, the army, far from being 
apolitical, was capable of political intervention and not always was it subtle about its 
actions: take for instance the Curragh incident of 1914 6 8. 
Strachan (1997). Chapter 5 (pp. 92-117) is most relevant here, not only for its assessment of the 
Curragh incident, but for the analysis of the army's political activities during our period. 
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French and German soldiers on the other hand had a legal apparatus constructed 
around them to protect them from the excesses of military discipline. The law was 
framed in a manner that offered at least a degree of tolerance of desertion. It is no 
coincidence that such a view existed in Germany and France, but not in Britain 
where there was no tradition of compulsion and it was not thought necessary to 
show leniency to men who had accepted the regulations when they volunteered 6 9. 
German soldiers also benefited from statutory rights whilst French poilus enjoyed 
the theoretical protection of their President, which although slow to be enacted 
doubtless saved many from the firing squads after 1915. Pre-war attitudes and tradi-
tional military practices were also markedly different in these continental armies 
with commanders accustomed to other forms of managing discipline such as the 
penal battalions. Alternatives were limited in the British code. 
British commanders were imbued with notions of authority rather than manage-
ment. In this they were aided by the law, which was constructed around the concept 
of deterrence. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that when confronted by a stalemated 
war, British commanders invariably grasped at traditional ideas rather than explor-
ing less well-trodden paths. This approach was epitomised by General Sir Horace 
Smith-Dorrien, commander of the 2 n d Army, when reviewing a case in 1915: 
There is a serious prevalence of desertion to avoid duty in the trenches, especially 
in the 8 t h Brigade and I am sure that the only way to stop it is to carry out some 
death sentences [my italics]70. 
In short the British went to war in 1914 with a military code that allowed a pro-
liferation of capital punishment to go unchecked. Paradoxically, the abolition of 
flogging - one of the few progressive features of the reforms - was a contributory 
factor. Lacking alternatives, British commanders were simply bereft of ideas short 
of capital punishment when it came to controlling the army during wartime. This 
had not proved to be a major problem in the minor wars at the end of the nineteenth-
century - not even the war in South Africa. But the intensive nature of warfare on 
the Western front in particular cruelly exposed the inadequacies in the rules for man-
agement of the army. Commanders, fearful of losing control of a much-enlarged 
army, were encouraged, expected even, to resort to capital punishment. Complicit in 
all this were the legislators who followed draconian criminal as well as military tra-
ditions when they acquiesced and allowed the army to maintain its grip on such a 
harsh and rigid system. 
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This is an important theme and one to which I will return in a forthcoming article. In short it is worthy 
of note at this point that after conscription was introduced into the British army there followed a sharp 
decline in the number of condemnations by courts-martial. See Oram (1998a, p. 42 and 1998b, p. 14). 
Private Scotton, executed February 1915. PRO W071/396. 
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